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Abstract 
If we frame the ongoing streaming transition occurring in the cultural industries as ‘content 
wars,’ with metaphoric ‘battlefronts’ in Hollywood, in Silicon Valley, and on Madison Avenue, 
then the silent arms dealer in this conflict is Wall Street and the investor class, whose financial 
engineering goes largely unacknowledged in studies of the media industries. This chapter will 
explore the impact of private equity in the American film, television, and music industries since 
2004. The mercenaries of these content wars, private equity firms have enacted leveraged 
buyouts in every sector of the cultural industries: major music labels (Warner, EMI), radio 
networks (Cumulus, Clear Channel/iHeartMedia), film and television production and distribution 
companies (MGM, Miramax, Univision, Dick Clark Productions), exhibition (AMC, Odeon), the top 
talent agencies (CCA, WME, IMG), audience measurement (Nielsen), and the trade press 
(Variety, The Hollywood Reporter, Billboard). The arms race in this conflict is the ability to 
monetize content catalogues across streaming platforms, which is a lucrative opportunity for 
financialization. From a critical political economy of media perspective attuned to the 
significance of financial capital, this chapter demonstrates that the financialization of various 
components of the media sector is facilitating a dramatic extraction of value from the cultural 
industries, leaving further consolidation in its wake. Who is profiting from the streaming 
transition and who is losing out? The answers are the same as in the wider economy of the 
second gilded age: the wealthy are extracting private, untaxed profit from the public arena while 
the middle class of creatives is being hollowed out. The ‘creative destruction’ of this war is 
being fueled by financial engineering. 
 
Andrew deWaard is an assistant professor at the University of California, San Diego and the co-
author of The Cinema of Steven Soderbergh: indie sex, corporate lies, and digital videotape 
(Columbia University Press/Wallflower, 2013). He is currently working on a project examining 
the financialization of film, television, and popular music.  
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Wall Street’s Content Wars: Financing Media Consolidation 
 
If we frame the ongoing streaming transition occurring in the cultural industries as 
‘content wars,’ with metaphoric ‘battlefronts’ in Hollywood, in Silicon Valley, and on Madison 
Avenue, then the silent arms dealer in this conflict is Wall Street and the investor class, whose 
financial engineering goes largely unacknowledged in studies of the media industries. This 
chapter will explore the impact of private equity in the American film, television, and music 
industries since 2004.1 The mercenaries of these content wars, private equity firms have 
enacted leveraged buyouts in every sector of the cultural industries: major music labels (Warner, 
EMI), radio networks (Cumulus, Clear Channel/iHeartMedia), film and television production and 
distribution companies (MGM, Miramax, Univision, Dick Clark Productions), exhibition (AMC, 
Odeon), the top talent agencies (CCA, WME, IMG), audience measurement (Nielsen), and the 
trade press (Variety, The Hollywood Reporter, Billboard). The arms race in this conflict is the 
ability to monetize content catalogues across streaming platforms, which is a lucrative 
opportunity for financialization. From a critical political economy of media perspective attuned 
to the significance of financial capital, this chapter demonstrates that the financialization of 
various components of the media sector is facilitating a dramatic extraction of value from the 
cultural industries, leaving further consolidation in its wake. Who is profiting from the streaming 
transition and who is losing out? The answers are the same as in the wider economy of the 
second gilded age: the wealthy are extracting private, untaxed profit from the public arena while 
the middle class of creatives is being hollowed out. The ‘creative destruction’ of this war is 
being fueled by financial engineering.  
Private Equity in the Music Industry 
Previously known as leveraged buyout firms or ‘corporate raiders’ during their rise in the 
1980s, private equity (PE) firms, such as Bain Capital, Blackstone Group, Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Co. (KKR), Texas Pacific Group (TPG), Thomas H. Lee Partners (THL), the Carlyle 
Group, and Apollo Management, operate a specialized, high-risk type of investment fund, 
available only to the wealthy or institutional investors such as pensions and endowments. Many 
PE firms are not traded publicly and are therefore subject to minimal regulatory oversight.2 
Typically operating investment funds with 5-10 year terms, PE firms raise enormous levels of 
debt against the assets of the target company (referred to as ‘leverage’), restructure and 
financially engineer the company to maximize efficiency, then sell the streamlined properties at 
high profit margins. Since the turn of the century, in part due to expansionary monetary policy 
                                                     
1 The following chapter is an abridged version of two longer, more detailed articles, which delve into the 
financialization of Hollywood and the music industry, respectively: deWaard, Andrew. “Financialized 
Hollywood: Institutional Investment, Venture Capital, and Private Equity in the Film and Television 
Industry,” JCMS: Journal of Cinema and Media Studies. Forthcoming; deWaard, Andrew. “The 
Financialization of the Music Industry,” Forthcoming. 
2 Post-crash, many of the biggest private equity firms went public as private equity became 
institutionalized, opportunities for massive buyouts decreased, and founders sought a massive payday: 
Blackstone filed in 2007, as did Fortress, KKR filed in 2010, Apollo in 2011, and Carlyle in 2012. Bain, THL, 
and TPG remain private. Regulation remains minimal. 
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and favorable tax breaks (particularly the ‘carried interest’ loophole), there has been a huge 
boom in PE deals, only temporarily slowed by the financial collapse. From 2002-2012, there 
were nearly 3,000 private equity firms in the U.S., which used $3.4 trillion of capital to make 
leveraged buyouts of almost 18,000 companies, employing roughly 7.5 million people.3  
The modus operandi of private equity firms is succinctly summarized by Appelbaum and 
Batt as “tak[ing] high risks using other people’s money.”4 Though they only invest 1 to 2 percent 
of the equity in the private equity fund, the PE firms (such as Bain, TPG, etc.) receive 20 percent 
of the profit if the rate of return achieves a certain threshold (usually 8 percent). To fund the rest 
of the acquisition, PE firms solicit investment from pension funds, endowments, sovereign 
wealth funds, and investment banks, while also raising debt in junk bond markets. With these 
massive funds (upwards of $20 billion), private equity firms target companies ripe for 
exploitation through financial engineering: paying themselves dividends, laying off high-wage 
labour, shifting to non-unionized workers, exploiting tax loopholes, selling assets for profit, 
going into and out of bankruptcy, and not honouring contracts. With little to lose if the 
company’s debt drives it into bankruptcy and much to gain if the investment can be exited from 
successfully, private equity is a textbook case of ‘moral hazard,’ as someone else bears the cost 
of their risks. ‘Distressed assets,’ or companies that are facing financial or operational difficulty, 
are prime targets for this kind of financial engineering. Since the turn of the century and the 
digital transition that accompanied it, the cultural industries have been seen as distressed 
assets and thus, have been in the crosshairs of private equity. 
There have been instances of vulture capitalism within the cultural industries in the past, 
such as Kirk Kerkorian’s pillaging of MGM in the 1970s and the corporate raiders that 
reconfigured Disney in 1980s. However, there has been a pronounced escalation of 
financialization in the media sector in the past two decades. The first major private equity move 
in the music industry – and a clear-cut example of private equity’s key strategies of profit 
extraction and labor reduction – occurred in 2004, when Warner Music Group was acquired for 
$2.6 billion by Bain Capital (co-founded by Senator Mitt Romney), along with two other private 
equity firms (Thomas H. Lee Partners and Providence Equity Partners), and Edgar Bronfman Jr. 
(former vice-chairman of Vivendi Universal). Warner Music Group had previously been part of 
the disastrous AOL Time Warner merger in 2000; the corporation eventually spun off its cable 
television and publishing divisions in addition to its music holdings. The day after the sale to the 
private equity firms cleared, the new owners of Warner Music Group cut 20% of the workforce, 
roughly a thousand employees.5 By year’s end, they had eliminated 2,000 of its 6,500-person 
workforce, trimmed its global operations, and reduced costs by $250 million.6 They also moved 
quickly to restructure the conglomerate, firing many executives, reducing its roster of artists, 
and combining labels and divisions in order to improve efficiency.  
                                                     
3 Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt, Private Equity at Work: When Wall Street Manages Main Street 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2014), 2, 37. 
4 Appelbaum and Batt, Private Equity at Work, 3. 
5 “Warner Music Plans to Eliminate 1,000 Jobs,” New York Times, March 3, 2004. 
6 Ronald V. Bettig and Jeanne Lynn Hall, “The Music Industry: The Payer Calls the Tune,” in Big Media, Big 
Money: Cultural Texts and Political Economics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 128. 
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Shortly after the sale, the new owners paid themselves a dividend of $350 million of 
Warner’s cash; later that year, they assembled more debt and paid themselves another $680 
million.7 Since the acquisition included $1.25 billion of equity capital, the investors had already 
recouped most of their investment within a year. When taking the company public in 2005, Bain 
and co. had sold enough shares to have effectively tripled their original investment. In 2011, the 
private equity firms earned one final bonus when they exited their investment by selling Warner 
Music Group for $3.3 billion to Access Industries, which has holdings in natural resources, 
chemicals, telecommunications, and real estate. Bragging about their profit and success in the 
Wall Street Journal, two Bain executives claimed to have “paid down debt and dramatically 
increased cash flow and earnings” at WMG, failing to mention what they eliminated in order to 
achieve that cash flow: the livelihoods of thousands of musicians and workers, as well as the 
productive capacity of the many historic labels in Warner Music Group.8 This was the first 
leveraged buyout in a series of deals that would facilitate the further consolidation of the music 
industry, as evidenced in Table 1.  
Table 1. Private Equity, Mergers, and Consolidation in the Music Industry, 2004-2019 
 
Year Target Buyer/Partner/Investor Cost/$ bn Type Medium 
2004 Warner Music 
Group 
THL Partners, Bain Capital, Providence 
Equity Partners, Edgar Bronfman 
2.6 Leveraged Buyout Recording 
2006 Cumulus Providence Equity Partners 1.2 Investment Radio 
2006 BMG Music 
Publishing 
Universal Music Group 2.1 Acquisition Publishing 
2007 EMI Terra Firma Capital Partners 4.7 Leveraged Buyout Recording 
2008 Bertelsmann 
Music Group 
Sony Music Group 1.5 Acquisition Recording 
2008 Clear Channel 
(iHeartMedia) 
Bain Capital and THL Partners 26.7 Leveraged Buyout Radio 
2010 Cumulus Crestview Partners --- Joint Venture Radio 
2010 Ticketmaster LiveNation --- Merger Live 
2011 EMI's recording Universal Music Group 1.9 Acquisition Recording 
2011 EMI's publishing Sony Music Group, ATV, PJSC,  
Jynwel Capital, Blackstone 
2.2 Acquisition Publishing 
2011 Warner Music Access Industries 3.3 Acquisition Recording 
2013 Beats Apple 3 Acquisition Audio 
                                                     
7 “A Hit On Their Hands,” The Economist, March 17, 2005. 
8 “Growing the ‘Private’ Club,” Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2007. 
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Products 
2013 UMG's divested 
labels 
Warner Music 0.76 Acquisition Recording 
2017 CBS Radio Entercom --- Merger Radio 
2019 Sony/ATV Music 
Publishing 
Sony Music Group --- Merger Publishing & 
Recording 
2019 Pandora SiriusXM 3.5 Acquisition Radio 
 
The next major instance of financialization in the music industry came in 2007 when 
venerable British music company EMI was taken over by private equity firm Terra Firma Capital 
Partners. Typical of a private equity firm, Terra Firma used debt-financing to acquire EMI in a 
$4.7-billion-dollar deal with the intent of extracting value by selling off its revenue streams to 
investors. However, the then-roiling financial crisis limited any potential buyers; instead, Terra 
Firma opted for dramatic restructuring: it fired the existing management and two thousand 
employees (45 percent of its workforce), while relentlessly focusing on maximizing profits and 
minimizing losses.9 Its strategy was characterized as seeking to “disempower the irresponsible 
‘creatives’, and impose financial discipline.”10 Many of those so-called irresponsible creatives 
decided to take their business elsewhere, including Paul McCartney, the Rolling Stones, Robbie 
Williams, and Radiohead. Unable to restore revenues in an industry struggling with the digital 
transition and unable to make payments on its loans, Terra Firma forfeited control of EMI to its 
primary lender Citigroup in 2011. 
Fresh off their success with Warner Music Group, Bain Capital and Thomas H. Lee 
Partners set its sights on an even bigger target in the music industry: Clear Channel, the largest 
operator of radio stations in the United States. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, the radio 
sector is projected to continue being more profitable ($48.2 billion) than either the live music 
($31.5 billion) or recorded music sector ($33.7 billion).11 With radio companies required to share 
only minimal revenue with musicians (who are supposed to be happy with the promotion), yet 
remaining a profitable sector because of advertising, financial firms saw an opportunity. The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 had dramatically deregulated the radio industry, no longer 
limiting the number of radio stations one company could own; Clear Channel had spent $30 
billion dollars to acquire more than 1200 radio stations, resulting in as many as seven stations 
in a single market, 60% of the rock radio market, and equity stakes in 240 international radio 
stations.12 Initiated in 2006 and completed in 2008 with one of the largest leveraged buyouts in 
history, an enormous $24 billion offer was made by Bain and THL; the layoffs followed shortly 
thereafter. Cutting roughly 10% of the workforce was just the start, as at least three more 
                                                     
9 “EMI Posts Full-Year $2.48 Billion Net Loss,” Billboard, February 4, 2010. 
10 Andrew Leyshon, Reformatted: Code, Networks, and the Transformation of the Music Industry (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 148. 
11 Paul, Bond. “China Film Market to Eclipse U.S. Next Year: Study.” The Hollywood Reporter, June 5, 2019. 
12 Bettig and Hall, “The Music Industry: The Payer Calls the Tune,” 143. 
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rounds of layoffs followed in the subsequent years.13 Smaller market radio stations were sold 
off and focus was shifted to only the most profitable stations. Local programming was reduced 
and replaced with syndicated regional and national programming. Instead of an explicit 
attention to local concerns, to which terrestrial radio has long excelled, top talent would pre-
record custom breaks and token localized content. Bain Capital and THL’s ruthless streamlining 
of Clear Channel deserves the bulk of the blame for the bland monoculture that radio has 
become. Top 40 stations now play the 10 biggest songs almost twice as much as they did a 
decade ago.14 Before long, the quantifier “Top 40” may need to be adjusted downward.  
In 2014, Clear Channel renamed itself iHeartMedia, a rebranding effort officially meant to 
signal its broader digital media presence, but most likely an attempt at dissociating from its 
poor performance. Saddled with $20 billion of debt that its private equity owners brought on as 
part of its buyout, iHeartMedia hasn’t turned a profit since 2007 and interest paid on its debt 
eats up a quarter of its yearly revenues. In 2018, it filed for bankruptcy in order to restructure its 
debt. Further job cuts and even more homogenous, dreary programming have resulted from 
meeting its debt obligations.  
The second largest radio operator in the country, Cumulus, has experienced a similar 
decade of private equity, consolidation, debt, streamlining, and homogenization. Again, Bain 
Capital and THL play a role, along with Blackstone, the country’s largest private equity and 
investment firm. These three firms extracted capital and exited their involvement in 2011; 
Cumulus then brought on new private equity firms, Crestview Partners and Macquarie Group, as 
well as $3.03 billion in debt-financing from banks, that helped Cumulus finance a deal to buy 
Citadel for $2.5 billion. Following a troubled merger with Disney’s ABC Radio, Citadel had 
recently emerged from bankruptcy, its shares ending up in the hands of debtholders, private 
equity firm TPG Capital, JPMorgan Chase, and hedge fund R2 Investments.15 Similar to 
iHeartMedia, private equity has financed the radio group’s massive scale, but has left it with a 
heavy debt load and declining profitability. Terrestrial radio continues to reach 93% of adult 
consumers, a pool of 240 million people that remains attractive to advertisers, but the large 
radio companies have become so highly leveraged by a decade of financialization that profit 
and growth seems unlikely.16 The private equity experiences of Warner Music Group, EMI, 
iHeartMedia, and Cumulus – four of the largest conglomerates in the music industry – 
demonstrate that the story of private equity is not just the rapid looting of profit in its 
successes, but also the debt-saddled wreckages it leaves in its failures.  
In 2012, the minimally competitive recording and publishing industries concentrated 
even further when Citigroup, having recently taken control of EMI from Terra Firma, sold EMI for 
parts. Most of EMI’s publishing arm was sold to a consortium headed by Sony and included 
                                                     
13 “Clear Channel Cuts 1,850 Jobs,” Billboard, January 20, 2009; Mike Stern, “Updated: Layoffs at Clear 
Channel,” Billboard, October 26, 2011; Mike Stern, “More Layoffs at Clear Channel Radio Stations,” 
Billboard, March 30, 2012; Mike Stern, “Layoffs Hit Major-Market Clear Channel Stations,” Billboard, 
December 7, 2012. 
14 Derek Thompson, “The Shazam Effect,” The Atlantic, December 2014. 
15 Bettig and Hall, “The Music Industry: The Payer Calls the Tune,” 145. 
16 Steve Knopper, “Is Terrestrial Radio Facing Its Judgment Day With Fierce Digital Competition?,” 
Billboard, May 19, 2016. 
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Blackstone, the Michael Jackson estate, sovereign wealth funds, and others. By 2019, Sony had 
bought out its partners and had complete control over the catalogue, merging its recording and 
publishing companies into Sony Music Group. Meanwhile, EMI’s recording arm was sold to 
Universal Music Group, including the lucrative Beatles catalog and historic labels such as 
Capitol, Decca, Def Jam, Geffen, Interscope, Island, Mercury, Motown, Polydor, Republic, Virgin 
and Verve. During the Universal-EMI antitrust hearings, an antitrust attorney estimated that the 
combined entity would control 42% of American recorded music revenue, transforming the 
market from “moderately concentrated” to “highly concentrated” as defined by the DOJ-FTC 
horizontal merger guidelines.17 Using 2011’s charts, UMG would have owned more than half of 
the titles on the Billboard Hot 100. Nevertheless, the merger was approved and the diversity of 
major companies in the recording industry has dwindled from six in the late 1990s to just three 
multinational corporations today. One condition of the merger was for UMG to divest of 
Parlophone, the esteemed label dating back to 1896; however, it was quickly acquired by Warner 
Music Group, nullifying any diversity the divestment requirement may have created. According 
to a Nielsen Music report in 2015, UMG occupies 39.2% of the “industry market share,” Sony has 
27.3%, and WMG has 19.4%, leaving just 13.2% to independent labels, and resulting in 86% of 
the market controlled by the ‘Big Three.’18  
Streaming technology has given rise to another predatory form of financial extraction for 
the Big Three recording labels: equity stakes that lead to massive paydays from IPOs and 
acquisitions. In order for a startup to make use of popular music in their platform or app they 
must enter into deals with UMG, Warner, and Sony, who leverage their dominant positions to 
attain prime pieces of early equity. UMG is the exemplar for this strategy, having earned a $404 
million payday from its equity in Beats, which was sold to Apple for $3 billion in 2014. Forbes 
estimates the total equity stakes held by the Big Three labels to be around 10-20% of the 
established streaming services, including Spotify, Rdio, Vevo, and Soundcloud, as well as 
significant pieces of other startups such as Interlude and Shazam.19 The total equity is 
estimated to be almost $3 billion, roughly 20% of the $15 billion or so the labels are currently 
valued at. Because the amount of profit shared with the artists is minimal at best, these deals 
are lucrative and power-asserting strategies for the Big Three labels, but also quite risky, 
considering the large amount of capitalization involved, premised on unproven business 
strategies in a fickle digital market. The bankruptcy of Rdio is one such example, with Sony 
losing millions from its investment, and Warner Music Group among its other creditors holding 
unsecured debt.20 Soundcloud, another popular streaming platform, was being evaluated for 
acquisition by Twitter in 2014, who then hesitated because the platform did not yet have 
licenses from the big labels. Equity stakes ended up being the cost of those licenses. Vevo, the 
                                                     
17 Gabriel Bluestone, “FTC should block the Universal/EMI merger,” The Hill, August 29, 2012. 
18 Ed Christman, “Q3 SoundScan Report: Taylor Swift and Bruno Mars Dominate, Streaming Surges,” 
Billboard, October 8, 2015. 
19 Zack O’Malley Greenburg, “Revenge Of The Record Labels: How The Majors Renewed Their Grip On 
Music,” Fortune, April 15, 2015. 
20 Eriq Gardner, “Rdio Was Losing $2 Million Each Month Before Bankruptcy,” Hollywood Reporter, 
November 17, 2015. 
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music-video company part-owned by Google, is another start-up of which the labels have equity. 
These are not one-off deals, but a distinct pattern of leveraging catalog for equity, utilizing a 
strategy similar to venture capital. 
The most important equity in the music industry is in Spotify and the Big Three each had 
or have substantial stakes; when the Swedish streaming service went public in 2018, each 
earned enormous paydays that were only moderately shared with the artists. Warner Music 
Group earned $504 million, only $126 million (25%) of which was paid to artists, with the biggest 
artists getting the biggest shares.21 Worse yet, payments only went to artists whose earnings 
had ‘recouped’ the label’s expenses, a notorious blackhole of ever-increasing spending. In other 
words, likely a large proportion of this cash remained at WMG. Sony earned roughly $750 million 
selling half of its stock and dispersed a portion to musicians based on each artist's percentage 
of the label's revenue. A familiar story: the rich got richer while middle class and independent 
musicians continued to struggle. 
Sitting atop lucrative, consolidated catalogs that provide reliable revenues and constrain 
any digital developments outside of their control, the Big Three are a lot less interested in 
cultivating new artists and far more interested in making strategic investments and maximizing 
their own assets. A key advancement in the ability to maximize assets is the use of ‘big data’ in 
order to quantify the now trackable digital outpouring of airplay, listens, downloads, ticket sales, 
merchandising revenues, likes, and other user data. The real time data provided by big data 
firms allow record label executives to know which artists and songs would be served by 
increased investment in marketing and which artists and songs should be discarded. 
Awareness and loyalty can be strengthened by data-driven engagement strategies, while tours 
and album releases can be strategized based on contextual, regional, and local data. Big data 
turns an artist roster into a stock market, where shares are bought and sold based on data 
markers and financial indicators of performance. 
The market domination of the Big Three music companies has allowed them to quickly 
acquire all of the leading big data companies in the music sector: LiveNation bought 
BigChampagne for an estimated $30 million in 2011; Spotify purchased Echonest for $100 
million in 2014; Apple acquired Acnu in 2013, as well as Semetric/Musicmetric for an estimated 
$50 million in 2015 and Topspin in its $3 billion purchase of Beats; Pandora acquired Next Big 
Sound for an undisclosed amount in 2015; Universal Music Group enacted a “Global Music Data 
Initiative” with the ad agency Havas in 2015; and each of the Big Three labels has equity stakes 
in Shazam, and thus access to their data and services. The big data harnessed by these firms 
are particularly relevant for how the Big Three devise their streaming platform strategy, where 
singles and abundance have become the norm, replacing albums and scarcity. As a result, 
playlists have risen in prominence as important sources of discovery. Much of the promotional 
discourse surrounding playlists is figured around the contrast between human-centered 
curation by skilled editors and data-based recommendation engines by algorithms, which has 
become a point of distinction between Spotify (machine) and Apple Music (human). The 
ownership implications behind these playlists, however, are rarely commented upon. As with 
                                                     
21 Steve Knopper, “One Sony Act Gets Nearly $1M in Mail As Labels Share Their Spotify Stock Profits,” 
Billboard, September 12, 2018. 
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data analytics, the major players have been making acquisitions of playlist companies: Warner 
bought playlists.net, Rdio bought TastemakerX, Google bought Songza, and Apple bought Beats, 
in part, for its curation development. On Spotify, three of the most popular playlists are Digster 
(run by Universal), Topsify (Warners), and Filtr (Sony). Naturally, each playlist favors its own 
artists.  
After a decade of bad headlines and declining revenues when the music industry 
struggled to adapt to mp3s and digital distribution, the music industry has found profitable 
growth in streaming music and live concert revenues. But after nearly two decades of financial 
engineering and consolidation, the growth in this market only benefits the investor class and 
tight oligopolies: the Big Three recording and publishing companies; LiveNation or AEG for live 
concerts; iHeartMedia, Entercom, or Cumulus for terrestrial radio; and the merged SiriusXM for 
satellite radio. Goldman Sachs estimates the future profit potential of just the recorded music 
industry to be upwards of $45bn annually by 2030.22 This could have been a glorious new era in 
music history, with digital access to the ‘celestial jukebox’ and sustainable remuneration for 
diverse music communities. Instead, the music industry is a hedge fund.  
Private Equity in Hollywood 
While the financialization of the music industry arguably began with the purchase of 
Warner Music Group in 2004 by Providence Equity Partners and other private equity firms, that 
same year, in another deal featuring Providence, historic Hollywood studio MGM was the target 
of a leveraged buyout as well. As evidenced in Table 2, MGM was the first blockbuster buyout in 
the era of Financialized Hollywood, followed by many others. Far from its halcyon days of Gone 
with the Wind and The Wizard of Oz, MGM struggled during the 1990s, losing $1.6 billion over 
just six years.23 Seizing the opportunity to acquire a distressed asset, a consortium of investors 
purchased MGM for $4.85 billion, each getting a sizable stake: Providence Equity Partners 
(34%), TPG Capital (23%), Comcast (21%), Sony (14%), and DLJ Merchant Partners (8%). As with 
most PE deals, the deal was highly leveraged, and MGM was saddled with $3.7 billion of debt. 
On paper, MGM’s assets looked promising: an 8000+ film library, 43,000+ hours of 
television, and a number of lucrative franchises. Sony hoped to exploit this catalogue with 
cross-content synergies, while Comcast intended to populate its cable and on-demand 
channels. However, the DVD market had just begun to decline; the digital sales, rentals, and 
subscription market had yet to take off; and MGM was releasing few films of its own. 
Furthermore, the standard private equity playbook of mass layoffs backfired: “so many people 
were let go,” according to Variety, “that MGM was no longer a viable operating company.”24 By 
2010, drowning in interest payments on its debt to the tune of $300 million a year, the company 
filed for bankruptcy in order to clear its debt. With a loan from JPMorgan Chase and two hedge 
funds, Anchorage Advisors and Highland Capital Management, it would reemerge the following  
                                                     
22 Tim Ingham, “Goldman Sachs Says 1.15bn People Will Pay For Music Streaming By 2030, As It Ups 
Industry Forecast,” Music Business Worldwide, June 5, 2019. 
23 Ronald Grover, “Getting MGM off the Back Lot,” Bloomberg Businessweek, March 2, 2003. 
24 Jill Goldsmith, “Hollywood edgy about stealth wealth,” Variety, December 17, 2006. 
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Table 2. Private Equity, Mergers, and Consolidation in Hollywood, 2004-2019. 
  
Year Target Buyer/Partner/Investor Cost/$ bn Type Medium 
2004 MGM Providence Equity Partners, TPG Capital, Sony, Quadrangle 
Group, DLJ Merchant Banking Partners 
4.8 Leveraged 
Buyout (LBO) 
Film/TV 
2004 Cinemark Madison Dearborn Partners 1.0 LBO Exhibition 
2004 AMC J.P. Morgan Partners, Apollo Global Management 2.0 LBO Exhibition 
2004 Odeon & UCI Terra Firma 1.2 LBO Exhibition 
2004 Universal General Electric/NBC 5.8 Merger Film/TV 
2006 Pixar Disney 7.4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2006 Nielsen 
Company 
THL Partners, Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts, Hellman & Friedman, AlpInvest Partners 
9.7 LBO Data 
2007 Univision TPG Capital, Providence Equity Partners, THL Partners, Madison 
Dearborn Partners, and Haim Saban 
13.7 LBO Film/TV 
2007 Hulu Providence Equity Partners 0.1 Investment Film/TV 
2008 Dreamworks Reliance ADA Group 0.3 Investment Film/TV 
2008 The Weather 
Channel 
Blackstone, Bain Capital, NBCU 3.5 LBO Film/TV 
2009 NBCU Comcast 37.3 Maj. Stake Film/TV 
2009 Marvel Disney 4.2 Acquisition Film/TV 
2010 Miramax Colony Capital 0.7 LBO Film/TV 
2010 AMC J.P. Morgan Partners, Apollo Global Management --- IPO Exhibition 
2010 CAA TPG Capital 0.2 Min. Stake Talent 
2011 Nielsen 
Company 
THL Partners, Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts, Hellman & Friedman, AlpInvest Partners 
--- IPO Data 
2012 WME Silver Lake ~0.3 Min. Stake Talent 
2012 AMC Dalian Wanda Group 2.6 Acquisition Exhibition 
2012 Lucasfilm Disney 4.1 Acquisition Film/TV 
2013 WME Silver Lake 0.5 Maj. Stake Talent 
2013 IMG WME/Silver Lake 2.2 Acquisition Talent 
2014 CAA TPG Capital 0.2 Maj. Stake Talent 
2016 Legendary Dalian Wanda Group 3.5 Acquisition Film/TV 
2016 Dreamworks 
Animation 
Comcast 3.8 Acquisition Film/TV 
2016 Starz Lionsgate 4.4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2016 Odeon & UCI AMC 1.2 Acquisition Exhibition 
2016 Carmike 
Cinemas 
AMC 1.1 Acquisition Exhibition 
2017 TimeWarner AT&T 85.4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2018 Wanda/AMC Silver Lake 0.6 Investment Exhibition 
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2018 Regal Cineworld 3.6 Acquisition Exhibition 
2018 Wanda/AMC Silver Lake 0.6 Investment Exhibition 
2019 Fox Disney 52.4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2019 CBS Viacom 30.0 Merger Film/TV 
 
week, but the original PE firms would lose out on their investment (as would any pension funds 
or endowments involved). Layoffs, of course, were severe.25 
In 2007, during the height of the pre-crash private equity boom, an even larger leveraged 
buyout occurred with the $13.7 billion takeover of Univision, the Spanish-language broadcasting 
giant. As the owner of the largest media properties in the fastest-growing demographic 
segment of the U.S. media industry, Univision was a prime target, attracting two consortiums, 
the first including PE giants KKR, Carlyle, and Blackstone.26 The winning consortium, consisting 
of Providence, TPG, THL, Madison Dearborn Partners, and Saban Capital Group, leveraged the 
deal with a debt level 12 times its annual cash flow, twice the norm of buyouts during that 
time.27 Within two years, it was weighed down by nearly $11 billion in debt, forcing it to sell its 
music arm to Universal Music Group (strengthening its monopolistic position in the music 
market) and to conduct multiple rounds of layoffs, including “periodic staff purges and 
management restructuring.”28 By 2017, Univision had ceded almost half of its audience to rival 
Telemundo and amidst declining advertising revenues, its PE firms were seeking to exit their 
investment by seeking an IPO to raise money in order to pay off its now-maturing $9 billion debt. 
Another prominent media company acquired during the boom, in 2006, was Nielsen, 
then called VNU NV, owner of Nielsen Media Research and venerable industry trade press 
publications Adweek, The Hollywood Reporter, and Billboard. Again, the formula is clear: a 
consortium of private equity companies (in this case, KKR, THL, Blackstone, Carlyle, Hellman & 
Friedman, and AlpInvest Partners) acquire the company for an enormous price ($9.7 billion), 
saddle it with excessive debt (still $8.6 billion five years later), strip its assets for quick profit 
(the iconic publications), slash its workforce (4,000 person ‘restructuring’), and exit the 
investment with a profit achieved through financial engineering (estimated 10% return in 2011, 
far higher than typical investments over that time period).29 The suite of trade publications sold 
off by Nielsen ended up in the hands of another investment firm, Guggenheim Partners, which 
acquired the properties in partnership with Pluribus Capital, naming the new company e5 Global 
Media. Through much turmoil and cost-cutting, it was renamed Prometheus Global Media, then 
subsumed under the Guggenheim Digital Media division once Pluribus Capital’s stake was 
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purchased. More publishing assets were acquired, including Backstage, Film Journal 
International, and Mediabistro, before the entire catalog of publications was spun out into its 
own company, Eldridge Industries. This kind of hot-potato ownership, in which a media property 
is bounced between multiple investment firms, each attempting to extract profit at the expense 
of labor, is not uncommon. 
For example, Dick Clark Productions, the historic production company created for its 
founder’s radio show in the 1950s and his subsequent television shows such as American 
Bandstand and The Dick Clark Show, continues to produce variety and event/award shows to 
this day. It attracted the interest of investment firms Mosaic Media in 2002 and Mandalay 
Entertainment in 2004, before being taken over by the private equity firm Red Zone Capital 
Management in 2007.30 It was then sold once again to a partnership led by Guggenheim 
Partners in 2012 and is now part of Eldridge Industries.31 To strengthen its trade publication 
portfolio including The Hollywood Reporter (film/television news) and Billboard (music industry 
news), Eldridge acquired SpinMedia in 2016, adding online publications tailored to specific 
music niches – Spin (alternative/rock), Vibe (R&B/hip hop), and Stereogum (indie) – creating a 
diverse stable of niche media content coverage. In 2018, its media holdings, including Media 
Rights Capital and a minority stake in A24, were merged into an entity called Valence Media. 
Most of the rival trade press and entertainment publications (Variety, Deadline Hollywood, 
Indiewire, Rolling Stone) are owned by Penske Media Corporation, which is funded by 
Quadrangle Capital Partners, a private equity firm, and Third Point LLC, a hedge fund. As 
Hollywood and the music industry is ravaged by private-equity extractions, its private-equity 
based trade press is not exactly incentivized to give critical coverage of the devastation. 
Silver Lake Partners & TPG Capital: Hollywood’s Private Equity Shadow Studios 
Following the financial crisis in 2008, many financial elites sought to take advantage of 
low interest rates and a landscape of distressed assets. Two private equity firms, Silver Lake 
Partners and TPG Capital, took a particular interest in Hollywood and over the subsequent years 
have assembled their own versions of film and television conglomerates. Hollywood’s talent 
agencies were the primary targets, the first of which was TPG’s investment in Creative Artists 
Agency (CAA), one of the industry’s two most powerful agencies. In 2010, TPG spent about 
$165 million for a 35% stake, then invested another $225 million in 2014 to give it a 53% stake.32 
Similarly, Silver Lake Partners acquired a 31% stake in William Morris Endeavor (WME), the 
industry’s other dominant talent agency, for $200 million in 2012, then followed that with a $500 
million investment in 2014 to give it the largest ownership stake. With Silver Lake's funding, 
WME acquired sports and media group IMG Worldwide Inc. for $2.4 billion in 2013;33 the 
                                                     
30 “Investor Group to Acquire Dick Clark Productions Inc.” Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2002. 
31 John Jannarone and Keach Hagey, “Guggenheim, Partners Buy Dick Clark Productions,” Wall Street 
Journal, September 4, 2012. 
32 Josh Rottenberg, “Wall Street investors to Hollywood talent agencies: 'Show us the money,'” Los 
Angeles Times, July 10, 2015. 
33 Ibid. 
13 
 
combined WME-IMG was now larger than its rival CAA in scale, with a market capitalization of 
roughly $5.6 billion.34 
         As we’ve seen, the first step in the private equity playbook is ‘lowering overhead’ and 
both CAA and WME-IMG have been lowering costs by laying off several top-earning agents, 
cutting bonuses, and reducing expenses.35 “Suddenly guys who had been there for fifteen, 
twenty years, who thought they were just going to be CAA lifers, were getting pushed out 
without a parachute,” claims a rival agent.36 Salaries and bonuses for top agents are nowhere 
near their previous heights, but those who have remained at CAA and WME-IMG have been 
incentivized with bits of equity that could translate to big paydays, if and when the companies 
go public.  
In contrast to this cost-cutting of labour, Silver Lake and TPG have been spending freely 
in order to expand the scope of WME-IMG and CAA’s business. Typically, in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest, union contracts in the industry forbid talent agencies from participating in 
film and television production; consequently, talent agencies have moved aggressively into 
alternative “content.” WME-IMG has been the most aggressive on this front, with expansions 
into sports (acquiring IMG and Professional Bull Riders), digital (partnering with Turner on an 
eSports league), events (acquiring Donald Trump’s Miss Universe Organization), and fine art 
(partnering with Frieze, a contemporary art fair), in addition to other agencies (acquiring the Wall 
Group, a stylist agency business, as well as Global eSports Management). By 2016, WME-IMG 
was ready to facilitate blockbuster deals itself, with the acquisition of the professional mixed 
martial arts organization Ultimate Fighting Championship. The purchase cost $4 billion, 
financed by Silver Lake Partners, KKR, and MSD Capital. Reflecting its by-then conglomerate 
status, WME-IMG was reorganized into a holding company in October of 2017 and renamed 
Endeavor, a callback to co-CEO Ari Emanuel’s original company, Endeavor Talent Agency. 
Behind the scenes, the talent agencies also began to skirt around the prohibition against 
film and television production. Both CAA and Endeavor, through the proxy of their private equity 
owners, set up inscrutable financing arms. Endeavor owns a stake in the Raine Group, a 
merchant bank that invests in digital, media, and entertainment companies, such as Vice. 
Through Raine, Endeavor invests in Media Rights Capital, the opaquely-named firm described as 
a “hybrid financier, rights-holder and development pod.”37It has been involved in a number of 
films that primarily feature so many Endeavor clients that it could hardly be a coincidence, such 
as Ted, A Million Ways to Die in the West, Furious 7, 22 Jump Street, and Elysium. Other investors 
in Media Rights Capital include Goldman Sachs, AT&T, advertising giant WPP, and the private 
equity firms ABRY Partners and Guggenheim Partners. 
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In 2015, Silver Lake Partners acquired Cast & Crew Entertainment Services for $700 
million. This 40 year-old company provides many backend accounting services to Hollywood 
productions, such as payroll processing, residuals processing, workers’ compensation services, 
health insurance, labor relations, production incentives, and production tax credit financing.38 
The following year, Silver Lake acquired Cast & Crew’s main competitor, CAPS Payroll. Owning 
the combined data of two of the biggest payroll companies in Hollywood is an obvious strategic 
advantage, as the same company negotiates wages and residuals for its clients while having 
the historical and industry-wide data about those rates. Silver Lake has thus fashioned a new 
type of content business with financialized vertical integration, a ‘shadow studio’ of sorts: the 
talent (Endeavor), the data (Cast & Crew/CAPS), the financing and production (Media Rights 
Capital, Endeavor Content, and IMG Original Content), exhibition (with an investment stake in 
AMC), and venture capital arms (Raine, WME Ventures).  
At TPG and CAA, there has been a similar financialized content production arm in STX 
Entertainment, a film and television studio created by film producer Robert Simonds and TPG 
managing partner Bill McGlashan in 2014. Initial investment came from TPG and Hony Capital, a 
Chinese private equity firm, with subsequent funding coming from a number of wealthy 
investors and a variety of East Asian firms. The publicized strategy is to develop, produce and 
self-distribute a slate of 8-12 films, targeting the star-driven, mid-range budget ($20-$80 million) 
films for adult audiences that the traditional studios have neglected in the era of franchises, 
superheroes, and children’s animation. Another way to look at STX, however, is as a production 
arm of CAA, as both are owned by TPG.  
Just as Silver Lake features its own Endeavor talent in its Media Rights Capital 
productions, TPG overwhelmingly features its own CAA talent in its STX productions. The Gift, 
Secret in Their Eyes, Free State of Jones, Bad Moms, and The Circle all feature above-the-line 
talent represented by CAA. STX negotiates its own distribution agreements directly with North 
American theater chains (AMC, Regal, and Cinemark), and its Chinese investors give it an 
advantage in being approved for release in their heavily-regulated and highly sought-after 
market. Silver Lake’s attempt at fashioning its own content studio has thus far produced mostly 
underperforming film and television, relative to their budget, but its financialized vertical 
integration has managed to mostly avoid the big Hollywood conglomerates and represents a 
new approach to content production and distribution. Platform One Media, Vice Media, and wiip 
are other content arms with significant investment from TPG. Like Silver Lake, it also has a 
number of venture capital arms, including Evolution Media Capital, CAA Ventures, and Creative 
Labs. 
         In recent years, the talent agencies have become bolder in flaunting the rules against 
production. Endeavor has both IMG Original Content, which has more than 50 series and 
specials on its roster, as well as Endeavor Content, which has financed, packaged and/or sold 
more than 100 films and TV shows since 2016, including best picture nominees Arrival, La La 
Land, and Manchester by the Sea. Known in industry jargon as double-dipping, the involvement 
of talent agencies in production was expressly banned by the Screen Actors Guild for nearly 60 
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years, but its legality has been in limbo since that agreement expired in 2002. This flagrant 
conflict of interest caught the attention of the Writer’s Guild, which began flagging the practice 
as early as March of 2018, claiming that “agencies have little incentive to defend or improve 
quotes (writers’ previous pay) because their compensation is not tied to the well-being of their 
client.”39  
After a breakdown in negotiations with the Association of Talent Agencies on April 12, 
2019, the WGA took the unprecedented step of instructing its writers to fire their agents, 
resulting in more than seven thousand writers – 92% of the guild – firing their agent. At issue is 
the WGA’s new Code of Conduct that prohibits agents from taking packaging fees (which they 
claim is a breach of fiduciary duty) or engaging in affiliate production (which they claim is a 
conflict of interest). At the time of writing, only a few smaller agencies have signed on to the 
Code of Conduct. The big agencies have filed lawsuits against the WGA instead, signaling a 
drawn-out, costly legal battle that the WGA might not be able to wage against firms backed by 
billion-dollar investment firms like TPG and Silver Lake. Regardless of the outcome, the bold 
labor action of the WGA demonstrates that creative workers in Hollywood are coming to terms 
with the scale of their financialized problem. Publishing a scathing report like “Agencies For 
Sale: Private Equity Investment and Soaring Agency Valuations” is an encouraging step in the 
right direction for the WGA,40 though the report only scratches the surface of the deep roots the 
financial sector has in Hollywood. 
Financing Media Consolidation 
The result of private equity and financial engineering in the cultural industries is an 
intensification of the consolidation that has been transforming the media sector since the 
1970s. Financialization is facilitating an increase in scale in a global marketplace and permitting 
big media companies to take on massive debt to enact mergers and acquisitions, as also 
documented in Table 2. Telecommunications companies have targeted content companies in 
order to expand beyond their traditional role as “dumb pipes” and explore a growth market, in 
such blockbuster deals as Comcast’s acquisition of NBCUniversal and AT&T’s purchase of 
DirecTV and Time Warner. Content companies, meanwhile, have sought out sources of 
intellectual property in order to expand content catalogues, as the sector transitions to 
streaming technology in which access is privileged over ownership. Mergers and acquisitions, 
and the broader issue of concentration of media ownership, are well-traveled ground in media 
industry history, but the understanding of the increasingly financialized dimensions of this 
ownership are lacking, especially its private equity aspects. The impact of PE’s financial 
engineering on the cultural industries is not to be underestimated; as Matthew Crain notes in an 
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early look at this phenomenon, “private equity ownership exacerbates the ongoing evisceration 
of our media institutions.”41 
The result of this consolidation, as it is elsewhere in the gilded economy, is stagnation, 
fewer jobs, homogeneity, and higher prices. Total movie ticket sales are on a steady decline, 
though profits have been propped up by increasing ticket prices, particularly 3D surcharges, as 
well as continued expansion into global markets, especially China. It’s not yet the oligopoly of 
three (Universal, Warner, Sony) that the recorded music industry has become, but if that 
industry’s experience with private equity and financialization is any indication, further 
concentration and inequality in Hollywood is on the horizon.   
Hollywood shares another parallel with the music industry in that a new streaming 
technology platform with considerable financial backing is transforming its distribution model. 
Just as Spotify is leading the way for a sea change in the economics and consumption patterns 
of recorded music, Netflix is pioneering a transition in the film and television industry. Unlike 
music, however, where the lines between consumption/distribution (Spotify, Apple Music, 
Pandora, etc.) and production/catalogue (Universal, Warner, Sony) are fairly distinct, resulting in 
minimal competition or innovation, the film and television industry is much more unsettled and 
the lines between production/distribution/consumption much more blurred. Netflix has moved 
aggressively into this precarious situation, transitioning from a DVD delivery service into a 
global streaming video platform, content producer, and the belle of Wall Street. Crossing the 
100 million subscriber mark in 2017, Netflix shares rose 13,000% since its IPO in 2002, making 
for the second highest returns on the S&P 500 over the last fifteen years.42 Originally seen by the 
conglomerates as just another release window, Netflix has become something of a frenemy to 
the conglomerates of Hollywood: a valuable destination to license its wares, but also a threat to 
its dominance as Netflix moves into original content production. Hedging their bets, four of the 
major studios developed an important counter-strategy: their own streaming platform, Hulu. 
With early investment from Providence Equity Partners, Hulu launched in 2006 and has 
grown into a formidable Netflix rival. Though it lacks the global footprint and total number of 
subscribers, Hulu has quickly surpassed Netflix in an important long-term metric: catalogue 
size. In addition to next-day availability of television shows from four of the five major networks 
and many cable channels, Hulu secured exclusive rights deals with Comedy Central, AMC, 
Bravo, E!, A&E, FX, Syfy, USA, Fox Sports, PBS, Nickelodeon, and Epix. As Netflix moved into 
original programming, so did Hulu, with high-profile, award-winning series. The result, by 2016, is 
a Hulu catalogue spanning more than 6,600 movies and nearly 3,600 television series, 
compared to Netflix’s 4,500 and 2,400, respectively.43 For Netflix, this represents a drop in its 
catalogue by over 50%, from a high of roughly 11,000 titles.44 Though the company accounts for 
                                                     
41 Matthew Crain, “The Rise of Private Equity Media Ownership in the United States: A Public Interest 
Perspective,” International Journal of Communication 3 (2009): 209. 
42 Lucinda Shen, “Netflix Went Public 15 Years Ago. It’s Been a Better Stock Than Apple or Amazon,” 
Fortune, May 22, 2017. 
43 Todd Spangler, “Amazon Prime Video Has 4 Times Netflix’s Movie Lineup, But Size Isn’t Everything,” 
Variety, April 22, 2016. 
44 Nathan McAlone, “Netflix's catalog has shrunk by a whopping 50% in the past few years,” Business 
Insider, October 2, 2016. 
17 
 
this drop by claiming it is focusing on original content production, the reality is a proxy fight 
between traditional Hollywood, Netflix, and Wall Street.  
The economics of distribution and licensing is just one of the battlefronts between 
Hollywood and Netflix; data is another crucial vector. Essential to Netflix’s public image and 
branding strategy is its data-savvy, particularly its ability to mine its global consumption data to 
improve the content it develops as well as the personalized, algorithmic suggestions for its 
users. But until Disney’s recent purchase of Fox, leading to their majority ownership of Hulu, it 
was jointly owned by Disney, Fox, Comcast, and Time Warner. Though unacknowledged in the 
trade press, I confirmed with a Hulu executive in a personal conversation that each of its parent 
companies have access to its trove of data (a common feature of corporate venture capital 
relationships). With such an extensive catalogue that spans many formats and demographics, 
the granular consumer data generated by Hulu gives an important advantage to these four 
Hollywood conglomerates. It also bound them together in their cold war with Netflix. 
This is not the first time legacy Hollywood companies have been challenged by new 
technology; in fact, Hollywood’s history is one of initially resisting but eventually profiting off of 
every technological advancement, from sound to television to satellite to cable to VHS/DVD and 
into the digital age. Disney+, HBO Max, and Comcast/NBCUniversal’s streaming platforms will 
join Hulu and CBS All Access, from the newly remerged ViacomCBS, as traditional Hollywood’s 
aggressive move into direct-to-customer (D2C) streaming distribution. History would suggest 
that streaming technology will merely be added to the array of entertainment formats that the 
Hollywood conglomerates dominate. The difference this time, potentially, is that the challengers 
are well-funded by a financial sector that is chasing dwindling investment opportunities in a 
hollowed-out economy. Looking for the next Facebook, investors have rewarded Netflix’s ability 
to rapidly grow its global subscriber base, ignoring its growing debt and comparative lack of 
earnings in the hopes of a future profit windfall. Amazon, similarly, received years of Wall Street 
investment despite a distinct lack of profits, using that coffer to increase scale and expand into 
a vast array of industries, including film and television. By 2016, Amazon Prime Video was 
offering 18,405 movies, nearly three times the size of Hulu’s catalogue, and dwarfing Netflix’s 
shrinking catalogue.45 Along with Apple and Google, each a crucial interface for the digital 
consumption of film and television, this handful of tech stocks has come to be known as 
‘FAANG’: Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google. In June of 2017, these five companies 
together held a market capitalization of $2.4 trillion, about 13 percent of the size of the United 
States economy, or the entire GDP of France.46 The FAANG companies only earned $77 billion in 
2016, however, most of which came from Apple’s lucrative iPhone sales, so their massive 
market cap is speculation on a severe scale. Wall Street is literally banking on a future in which 
these five companies dominate and monopolize their respective industries. Will traditional 
Hollywood conglomerates become mere content suppliers to these bigger tech titans, or will 
they be able to compete for customers on their own terms? Unfortunately for us as citizens, the 
terms of this competition are not content, or culture, but mere financial extraction.  
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Conclusion 
The cultural industries have transformed into a financialized market with only a few 
powerful players who are seemingly ‘too big to fail.’ The percentage of artists who have a 
dominant role in such a marketplace is unsurprising: in music, the top 1% account for 77% of all 
artist recorded music income. Though the top 1% accounted for 75% of CD revenues, that 
proportion is rising and has now grown to almost 80% of subscription streaming revenue.47 One 
might think the vast expansion of available music online would lead to more diverse 
consumption but the opposite is true. Even though the amount of digital music sold has 
increased, the 10 top-selling tracks command 82 percent more of the market than they did a 
decade ago.48 This stratification is not just in recording, but in the live sector as well. Ticket 
prices and sales have surged in the last two decades, with average ticket prices far outpacing 
the consumer price index. This accounts for some of the reason why artists depend on it more 
than ever. But live revenues are also becoming more and more concentrated. In 1982, the top 
1% of artists accounted for roughly a quarter of concert ticket revenues; by 2003, it was 56%. 
The top 2-5% of artists also increased their share of the pie; while the remaining 95% used to 
have almost 40% of the market, by 2003 they were left with less than 15%.49 This kind of 
trajectory surely reminds us of other shocking statistics of widening income and wealth 
inequality that we are all-too-familiar with in this new gilded age. In Hollywood, stratospheric 
paydays for CEOs and prestige talent are increasingly common, while the struggles of middle-
income creatives and below-the-line labor is ever more precarious. 
Consumers used to buy media products on a one-off basis and the gatekeepers charged 
their percentage. There was considerable consolidation, but the key was continued performance 
and reinvestment, etching out profit based on the ability of their creative and marketing talent to 
reach an audience. Now, consumers pay a gatekeeper for digital access to consolidated 
catalogs that have reached such a scale that competition is rendered ever more minimal. 
Cultivation of talent now takes place in a ‘digital farm league,’ where creators hustle online on 
social media in order to generate an audience of their own, proving themselves worthy of being 
chosen for the big leagues, where even then they will still get only a minor cut, with decreasing 
leverage. The primary strategy is maximization of assets through catalog building. The 
conglomerate model of vertical and horizontal integration where a series of total but competing 
supply chains deliver media commodities may be outmoded; the focus is now leveraging 
catalogs as an asset of shareholder value. A conglomerate suggests a hierarchy and a stable 
supply chain, whereas finance suggests flexibility, insurance, quickly reallocating resources, 
short-term gain, hedging risk, and a precarious workforce. Maybe this is a different form of 
cultural oligopoly, not based on vertical integration, but on building a digital fence around the 
one facet of the industry that a company controls, waging a vigorous defense of intellectual 
property, and charging rent on that territory, at the expense of its creators.  
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If this is true, then the media business is no longer about selling commodities, but 
building a diversified portfolio that responds to risk and volatility: a cultural hedge fund. In the 
conglomerate model, there were tools all along the value chain with which to cultivate talent and 
sell content. Now there is merely a monopoly or tight oligopoly with which to extract rent on 
cultural territory. Because earning profit in the cultural industries is so risky, with fickle 
audiences constantly changing behaviours and tastes, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
entertainment market has been held captive to risk-hedging practices developed in the financial 
sector. But finance is not concerned with building anything, it merely follows, invests, hedges, 
exploits, and extracts. It calls this efficiency. Financial capital is not interested in the long-term 
profitability, market share, or brand power of the cultural industries. It is not even interested in 
culture. It is just interested in the highest possible return in a short period of time. Private equity 
firms and financialization strategies bring new meaning to Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of 
‘creative destruction’; the finance sector is actively dismantling the creative industries for short-
term profit. The implications of financial capital on the production and circulation of culture are 
the same as they are in the wider economy: a corrupt infrastructure, a plutocratic ruling class, a 
shrinking middle class, and vast inequality. 
